Issue
- Whether Due Process and Equal Protection forbid a court from ordering payment of any financial obligation without first finding a defendant has an ability to pay.
Holding
- A challenge to the amount of a criminal fine should initially be reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions.
- The ancillary costs imposed here do implicate equal protection principles. Upon request, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code,§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov.Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)).
Background
- Hernandez and Kopp, were convicted by jury of multiple felonies. At the sentencing hearing, Hernandez’s counsel asked the court to impose a minimum restitution fine and stay additional payment orders due to his inability to pay. The court denied the request on the belief that a determination of inability to pay occurs at a later date when the fine is or may be imposed, not necessarily on the date of sentencing, and Hernandez may be able to earn funds while he is incarcerated.
- On appeal, Hernandez challenged the monetary orders because the court did not first find he had an ability to pay them. The Court of Appeal majority had held the trial court should have considered whether Hernandez had the ability to pay before imposing ancillary costs, but rejected his claim that such a finding was required as to fines. It clarified, however, that the defendant could challenge the fines under the federal and state constitutional excessive fines clauses. The matter was remanded for resentencing and further proceedings as to the imposed fines and ancillary costs. Hernandez appealed the ruling to the State Supreme Court.
CA Supreme Court’s Reasoning
- The court’s discussion is limited to those impositions that are mandatory without consideration of an ability to pay: the $50 lab fee (with attached $155 of penalty assessments), and the $40 court operations and $30 court facilities assessments, multiplied by Hernandez’s three unstayed offenses, totaling $415.
- Although the lab cost is labeled as a fee, the court has recognized that the Legislature “understood and intended” the payments to be “fines, penalties, and punishment”. The assessments and surcharges here, which are applicable to many fines, added $155 to the lab fee and are likewise properly understood as fines. The court did not find a due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine; the excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines, but Hernandez did not invoke the excessive fines clauses in the trial court.
- The ancillary costs imposed here do implicate equal protection principles. With respect to the court operations and facilities assessments, Hernandez contended that he is treated unequally compared to indigent civil litigants because statute regarding civil fees allows waivers of similar ancillary costs for those unable to pay them. He argued that there is no rational basis for not granting criminal defendants a similar opportunity to avoid such costs before they are imposed. The court agreed, finding that “where the Legislature has already determined that both criminal defendants and civil litigants should be charged similar amounts for the same reasons, there appears no rational basis to deny only indigent criminal defendants the ability to avoid those costs”. The court concluded that equal protection requires a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment or a court facilities assessment.
Outcome
The court ordered the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed with directions to remand the matter to the superior court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion as to the imposition of fines and ancillary costs. In all other respects, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.